Security architecture
The full
technical stack.
Nightjar doesn't rest on a single algorithm or a single clever trick. Every component has a job — and we say plainly where each one stops. Here is the cipher, the key hierarchy and the design decisions that stand between your files and everyone else.
Files, thumbnails, metadata and each vault's index are encrypted on your iPhone with AES-256-GCM. Your code is run through a deliberately slow key-stretching step and a part that passes through this phone's Secure Enclave, producing a vault key that unwraps a random 256-bit key — one per vault, with no master key anywhere. The strength of the whole is the strength of the chain, so every link, and its limits, is listed below.
The encryption pipeline
From a pattern
to sealed files.
Your code
A pattern, PIN or passphrase. Never stored, and nothing that could rebuild it is written down.
Slow derivation + Secure Enclave
A deliberately slow, high-cost key-stretching step, with a part that runs through this iPhone's Secure Enclave and is different on every attempt.
Vault key
The result finds and opens one vault. Because the Enclave took part, it is tied to this specific phone.
Random 256-bit vault key
Each vault has its own. There is no master key for the phone, and we hold none.
AES-256-GCM
Encrypts every file, thumbnail and note and the vault's own index, each sealed with its own fresh nonce.
- 01
Authenticated encryption, end to end
Nightjar uses AES-256-GCM — the Advanced Encryption Standard with a 256-bit key in Galois/Counter Mode — not only for file content but for thumbnails, the vault index, file headers and metadata. GCM seals every value with an authentication tag that acts as a tamper seal.
Why it matters
If a single bit of the ciphertext changes — a malicious edit or a corrupted disk sector — the tag no longer matches and the file fails to open. You get a clear failure, not silently wrong or attacker-chosen output.
- 02
A fresh nonce for every file and every chunk
A naive design encrypts two identical files into identical ciphertext, which leaks that they are the same without decrypting anything. Nightjar generates a fresh cryptographic nonce for each sealing operation; large files are encrypted in ordered chunks, each with its own nonce under a random base.
Why it matters
Two copies of the same photo never produce the same encrypted bytes, and a truncated or reordered file is caught instead of opening wrong.
- 03
Your code is never written down
Your pattern, PIN or passphrase runs through the slow key-stretching step and then the per-attempt Secure Enclave step. The result is what locates and unwraps the vault. The code itself, and anything that could reconstruct it, is never stored.
Why it matters
A copy of the app's files and Keychain cannot be guessed at on a fast computer: each guess needs this phone's Secure Enclave to take part, so guessing has to happen on the phone, at the phone's speed, with the lockout in the way.
- 04
What the Secure Enclave does — and doesn't
The Secure Enclave takes part in turning your secret into the vault key, and that is what ties the keys to this phone. It does not run the file encryption itself.
The AES work happens in the app, so while a vault is open its keys are in the app's memory. Locking, flipping the phone face-down, the idle timer or a crash drops them, and the next launch needs a fresh unlock. Clearing memory is best effort — the app wipes the buffers it controls but can't prove no copy exists elsewhere. On an iPhone without a Secure Enclave the app uses a Keychain secret instead, which is weaker, and the Keys screen says which path is in use.
- 05
A key per vault, and no master key
Every vault is given its own random 256-bit key when it is made. Opening one vault proves nothing about another, and there is no phone-wide master key that could unlock everything at once.
Why it matters
Nothing we hold could open a vault even if we were compelled to, because the only keys are the ones your code derives on your phone.
- 06
Nothing says how many vaults exist
The place where vault headers live looks identical whether you have one vault or ten, every encrypted file sits under a random name in one shared pool, and the app never keeps a count.
Why it matters
Someone holding the phone can't tell how many vaults exist or which code opens which — which is also what makes a believable decoy possible: a second code opens a second, real vault, and nothing points back at the first.
- 07
Wrong guesses slow to a crawl
After three wrong attempts the app waits 30 seconds, then a minute, then five, then fifteen after ten. The wait survives restarting the app or changing the clock, and you can choose to erase everything after ten wrong attempts.
Why it matters
A short pattern or PIN is easy to type over and over; the lockout turns a few hundred guesses into hours, and the Secure Enclave step turns guessing on another machine into a non-starter.
- 08
What we hold: nothing
There is no account, sign-in, user id or device id — nothing on our side knows you exist. We keep no key, code or recovery phrase. Vault content never comes to us: Send securely makes an encrypted file on the phone that you send yourself.
Why it matters
A breach or a subpoena of us turns up ciphertext we can't read and no key to read it with. There is no backdoor to add, because there is no key to add it to.
Questions
The honest
answers.
The ones worth asking of any app that says it keeps your files private.
Is AES-256 realistically breakable?
Not by brute force. A 256-bit key has 2²⁵⁶ possible values — more than there are atoms in the observable universe. The cipher is not the part that gets attacked; a short pattern or PIN is. For anything that really matters, choose a passphrase.
What does the Secure Enclave actually do here?
It takes part in deriving the vault key, which ties the keys to this specific phone. It does not perform the file encryption — that runs in the app, so an open vault's keys are in app memory until the app locks. On a phone without a Secure Enclave the app falls back to a Keychain secret and says so.
What do your servers ever receive?
Nothing, in this version. There is no account, no statistics and no upload; a file made with Send securely goes wherever you send it, never to us.
Can a jailbroken iPhone compromise my vault?
Software that controls the phone can read what's on screen and in memory while a vault is open, and no app can protect against that. The design relies on iOS process isolation, the Keychain and Data Protection, so keep a current, non-jailbroken iPhone.
Does Nightjar strip photo metadata?
Yes, on import. Photos lose location (GPS), EXIF, IPTC, XMP, maker notes and camera fields; only the orientation is written back, and JPEG pixels are copied without re-encoding. Videos lose their metadata too, with the samples copied as they are. The date taken is kept only inside the vault's encrypted index. The file is then encrypted with AES-256-GCM before it is written to disk.
What happens to the keys when the app closes?
Active key state is dropped when the app locks, when you flip the phone face-down, on the idle timer and on relaunch; a crash hands the process back to iOS. Clearing memory is best effort, and the next open needs a fresh unlock.
Honest limits
Where each layer
stops.
No method of storage is perfectly secure, and we don't claim Nightjar is. A layered design is only as strong as its weakest link, so here are the links.
- A short pattern or PIN is the weakest link. The setup screen estimates how long guessing would take on your phone; choose a passphrase for anything that really matters.
- Someone running code on your unlocked phone can try guesses there, at the phone's speed. The lockout in the app doesn't slow that down.
- On an iPhone without a Secure Enclave the app uses a Keychain secret instead, which is weaker, and says so in its Keys screen.
- Overwriting deleted files is best effort on flash storage; the real protection is the encryption.
- The design has not yet had an independent security audit. One is planned, and the results will be published here.