Security
How Nightjar's
security works.
What protects your photos, where the keys are, what leaves your iPhone and what never does, in plain English. The honest limits are near the end. This describes version 1.0 for iPhone and iPad.
Encryption
What is encrypted,
and with what.
Everything you put in a vault is encrypted on your iPhone before it is stored. Nothing is uploaded to be encrypted somewhere else.
- 01
Everything in a vault, not only the photos
What
Every photo, video, note, scan, file, card and saved login is encrypted on your iPhone with AES-256-GCM before it is written to disk. So are the thumbnails and the details around them: names, dates, folders, albums and the vault's own index. Every file sits in one shared folder under a random name with no extension.
Why it matters
A look at Nightjar's storage shows roughly how much is stored and nothing else: not what the files are, what they are called, or which vault they belong to.
- 02
Each vault has its own key
What
Every vault gets its own random 256-bit key when it is made. Large files are encrypted in pieces, and every file and every piece gets a fresh random value, so two identical photos never look identical on disk, and a cut-off or altered file refuses to open instead of opening wrong.
Why it matters
There is no master key for the phone. Opening one vault proves nothing about another, and nothing we hold could open any of them.
- 03
Standard, published building blocks
What
AES-256-GCM for the files; a deliberately slow key-stretching step for your code; HKDF, SHA-256 and HMAC for deriving and checking keys; X25519 for files shared into Nightjar from other apps; and a P-256 key held in the Secure Enclave. All of it comes from Apple's own CryptoKit and CommonCrypto libraries.
Why it matters
Nothing is home-made. Each of these has been studied in public for years, which is what you want from encryption.
- 04
Files shared in from other apps
What
When you use Save to Nightjar in another app's share sheet, the file is sealed to a key only the Nightjar app holds before it is written anywhere. The app opens it and moves it into your vault at the next unlock.
Why it matters
Nothing waits in the clear between the moment you share it and the moment you next open Nightjar.
- 05
Location and camera details are removed on import
What
Photos lose their location, camera make and model, lens, dates, software and other tags when they come in; only the orientation is kept. That includes a photo you paste in. Videos lose theirs too, without re-encoding the picture or sound. The date taken is read first and kept only inside the vault's encrypted index, for sorting.
Why it matters
A photo you later export, save to Photos or send carries no location or camera details. If a video can't be processed, it is kept as it arrived.
Keys
Where the keys live.
Not with us.
Three things matter: your device's Secure Enclave, your pattern, PIN or passphrase, and your recovery phrase. We hold none of them.
- 06
Your pattern, PIN or passphrase is never stored
What
It is run through a slow key-stretching step and then through this iPhone's Secure Enclave, in a step that is different for every attempt. The result finds and opens the vault. Nothing that could rebuild your code, or the key it makes, is written down.
Why it matters
A copy of the app's files and Keychain is not enough to guess your code on a fast computer, because every guess needs this phone's Secure Enclave. Guessing has to happen on the phone, at the phone's speed.
- 07
What the Secure Enclave does, and doesn't
What
The Secure Enclave is a separate, locked-down chip in your iPhone or iPad. It takes part in turning your code into the vault key, which is what ties the keys to this device. It does not run the file encryption itself: while a vault is open, its key is in the app's memory.
Why it matters
Locking, leaving the app, the idle timer or flipping the phone face-down (if you turn that on) drops the key. Encryption monitor, under Unlock & Face ID in Nightjar's settings, shows whether your keys are tied to the Secure Enclave on your device.
- 08
The recovery phrase
What
Your first vault gets a 12-word recovery phrase during setup (24 words if you want extra margin), from the standard 2,048-word list; any vault can make one in Settings. It is shown once and kept inside the vault's own encrypted records so you can see it again. A typo is caught before anything is tried.
Why it matters
It is the way back in if you forget your code. Like your code, it goes through this device's Secure Enclave, so in this version it opens the vault on this iPhone only. Write it down and keep it somewhere safe.
- 09
Split recovery: 3 shares, any 2
What
If one written-down phrase feels like a single point of failure, Nightjar can split a 12- or 24-word phrase into 3 shares of 20 (or 33) words with SLIP-39, a published standard; any 2 give back the same phrase. It is free, asks for Face ID or the vault's code first, and the shares are shown with screenshots blanked. The app never saves them: they are worked out from the phrase while shown, and 2 shares are simply turned back into the phrase and used the usual way.
Why it matters
Keep the shares in different places: one found share reveals nothing, and losing one still leaves two. The phrase keeps working alongside them, and making a new phrase makes old shares useless. Exactly like the phrase, in this version they open a vault on the iPhone it was made on, for when you forget your code; they don't move a vault to a new phone.
- 10
We can't open a vault, or reset a forgotten code
What
There is no account, no copy of your keys anywhere but your device, and no back door. We never see your code or your recovery phrase.
Why it matters
That means nobody can get in for you, including us, and nobody can be made to. It also means that if you forget your code and lose your recovery phrase, that vault cannot be opened by anyone.
- 11
There is no list of vaults
What
The place where vault headers live always holds the same number of same-sized files, whether you have one vault or eight. The app never keeps a count.
Why it matters
Someone looking at the phone can't tell how many vaults exist or which code opens which. That is what makes a believable decoy possible. For the same reason, Storage in Settings shows only the open vault's own files, never a total for the app, and gallery search only ever looks inside the open vault.
Decoy and duress (Pro)
If someone makes you
unlock it.
A duress code lets you comply and show something real. It helps in some situations and not in others, and you should know which before you rely on it.
What it does
- With Pro you can set a duress code: a second pattern, PIN or passphrase that opens a separate decoy vault with its own contents. Fill it with something believable.
- From inside the decoy nothing lists, counts or reaches your other vaults; their headers look like empty slots. Changing settings or the code inside the decoy changes only the decoy.
- Using the duress code turns Face ID off, so it can't open your real vault while someone else holds the phone. You turn it on again after you next open your real vault.
- By default ("hide") nothing is deleted: your real vaults stay on the phone, encrypted, and open later with their own codes.
- If you choose "also delete everything else" when you set it up, the duress code permanently deletes every other vault on the phone, including the one that set it up, and the keys that could open any leftover pieces. That cannot be undone.
- The decoy shows no ads and looks like any other vault. Its settings offer Delete this vault like any other; used there, it empties only the decoy.
What it doesn't protect against
- A forced recovery phrase. There is no duress version of a recovery phrase: if someone makes you hand over your real recovery phrase, or two of its shares, it opens your real vault.
- Someone who already knows your real code, or who watched you unlock.
- In hide mode, a copy taken later. Your real vault is still on the phone; anyone who takes a forensic copy and later gets your real code can open it. Destroy mode avoids that, at the cost of losing those vaults for good.
- Suspicion. Someone who knows Nightjar offers decoys may not believe the decoy is all there is. Nightjar makes it impossible to prove another vault exists, not impossible to suspect one.
- Intruder photos and wrong attempts. These are kept per phone, not per vault, so any open vault, the decoy included, can show the intruder photos and the count of wrong attempts.
Everyday protections
Around the vault.
Most leaks are ordinary: a guessed PIN, a screenshot, a phone left open. These cover them by default.
- 12
Wrong attempts slow down
What
After 3 wrong tries the app waits 30 seconds, after 4 a minute, after 5 five minutes, and after 10 fifteen minutes. The wait survives restarting the app and changing the clock, and during it even the right code does nothing. You can choose to have everything erased after 10 wrong attempts.
Why it matters
A short pattern or PIN is easy to try over and over. The lockout turns a few hundred guesses into hours.
- 13
Intruder photos stay on the phone
What
With Pro and your permission, the front camera takes a photo after a wrong attempt (the 3rd in a row, unless you choose the 1st or 2nd). It is off by default. On the free plan you still see how many wrong attempts were made while you were away.
Why it matters
The photos and the attempt log are encrypted with a key kept in this phone's Keychain, and are never uploaded or sent to anyone. iOS shows its green camera dot while the photo is taken, so the person may notice. Check the law where you live before using it on others.
- 14
Screenshots come out black
What
Screenshots and screen recordings of an open vault come out black by default. Taking a screenshot, or starting a screen recording or mirroring, also locks the vault at once (on by default), and the lock screen says why.
Why it matters
The most common leak is mundane: a screenshot that ends up in the camera roll or a cloud album. You can turn either off in Nightjar's settings.
- 15
Only Apple's keyboard
What
Keyboards from other apps see everything typed with them, and with Full Access they can send it anywhere. Nightjar refuses them everywhere in the app, so your PIN, passphrase, recovery phrase, notes, cards and passwords are typed on Apple's keyboard. Secrets are typed with suggestions, spell check and learning off, and the vault's code is never offered to iOS Passwords to save. For PINs, Shuffle the keypad (off by default) puts the digits in a new order for each entry.
Why it matters
An installed keyboard is the realistic keylogger on an iPhone. This doesn't help on a jailbroken or compromised phone, and it doesn't stop someone watching your screen while you type a passphrase; the shuffled keypad makes a watched or smudged PIN harder to read.
- 16
It locks itself
What
Leaving Nightjar locks it at once. While it is open it locks after 2 minutes without a touch (you can change this). Flip to lock, off by default, locks it when you put the phone face-down. Copied codes, phrases, passwords and card numbers are cleared from the clipboard after 30 or 60 seconds.
Why it matters
A phone left on a table, or handed over for a moment, doesn't stay open.
- 17
A lock clears what it can
What
Every way of locking goes through one step: the keys are dropped (the recovery-phrase and decoy key bytes are overwritten first), what the app held in memory is emptied, a recording in progress is stopped and its file deleted, and temporary files are removed. The app switcher shows a cover over every screen, sheets included, instead of what was open; with a disguise on, it shows the disguise.
Why it matters
What was open shouldn't outlive the lock or show up in the app switcher. Clearing memory is best effort: the app wipes what it controls but can't prove no copy exists elsewhere in memory.
- 18
Sending to someone else
What
Send securely (Pro) puts the items you choose into one file encrypted on your iPhone with AES-256-GCM under a passphrase you choose. You send the file yourself; they open it in Nightjar, free. Photos in it carry no location or camera details.
Why it matters
No server sits in the middle. The weak point is the passphrase: anyone with the file can guess offline as often as they like, so the app asks for at least 10 characters and a passphrase rated Fair or better.
No account, no analytics
What leaves your iPhone,
and what never does.
Nightjar has no account and makes no connection to us. These are the only things that leave the device, and most only when you choose.
What can leave
- On the free plan, one small banner ad at the end of the gallery, from Google AdMob. To show it, Google receives your IP address, device and app details (model, iOS version, language, app version), an identifier it may set for this app to limit repeats and stop fraud, and whether the ad was shown or tapped.
- The ad is never personalised: Nightjar never shows the tracking prompt, so iOS gives Google no advertising id. In the EEA, the UK and Switzerland, Google's consent form appears once, and Ad privacy choices in Nightjar's settings changes your answer. Pro has no ads and sends Google nothing.
- Purchases go through Apple's App Store. Apple handles the payment; we don't see your name, Apple Account or card.
- A support email, only if you write one, from your own email app. It carries the Nightjar and iOS versions and whatever you write.
- What you choose to take out: a Send securely file you send, a copy you export, or a copy you save to Photos (those copies are no longer encrypted, and the app warns you first).
- If your iPhone is set to share analytics with app developers, Apple may send us anonymous crash logs. That is Apple's setting, not ours.
What never leaves
- Your photos, videos, notes, files, cards and logins.
- Your keys, your pattern, PIN or passphrase, and your recovery phrase.
- Intruder photos and the wrong-attempt log.
- Vault names, how many vaults you have, or which screen you are on beyond "the gallery" for an ad.
- Anything to us at all: this version of the app makes no connection to our servers.
- Your vaults into iPhone or iCloud backups. Nightjar leaves them out on purpose: their keys never leave the device they were made on, so a backed-up copy could never be opened, and would only use your iCloud storage, outlive an erase and show how much you keep.
By design
- No account or sign-in. The app makes no user id, device id or advertising id, so nothing on our side knows you exist.
- No analytics or crash-reporting software in the app, and no usage statistics in this version. This website runs no analytics and sets no cookies.
- No selling or sharing of your data, no data brokers, and no tracking.
- No claims we can't back up: nothing here is called unbreakable, and nothing still to come is called available.
Not in this version
Built, but
not switched on.
These exist in the code but are off in version 1.0. Nothing about them reaches you or us until a later version turns them on, and this page will say so first.
- Encrypted iCloud backup. Built and tested, not switched on. Until it ships, a vault exists only on the device it was made on.
- Sync between your iPhone and iPad, and pairing two devices.
- A hardware key such as a YubiKey as a second key for a vault (coming once it has been tested on real hardware).
- Sharing a vault through our server, the emergency envelope and the lost-phone lock and erase.
Honest limits
What it can't do.
Said plainly.
No method of storage is perfectly secure, and we don't claim Nightjar is. These are the limits we want you to know about before you trust it with anything.
- No backup in this version. If your iPhone is lost, broken or replaced, its vaults go with it. Vaults aren't in iPhone backups, and their keys are tied to the original device, so a new iPhone can't open them, not even with the recovery phrase.
- A short pattern or PIN is the weakest link. The setup screen tells you roughly how long guessing would take on your phone; use a long passphrase for anything that really matters.
- Someone running code on your unlocked phone can try guesses there, at the phone's speed, and the in-app lockout doesn't slow that down. A long passphrase is what holds up against it.
- Nightjar trusts your iPhone, iOS and the Keychain. A jailbroken or otherwise compromised phone can read the screen, the keyboard and memory while a vault is open, and no app can prevent that.
- On a device without a Secure Enclave the app uses a Keychain secret instead, which is weaker: someone who extracts the Keychain could guess on another computer. The Encryption monitor says which path your device uses.
- Someone with a copy of the app's files and Keychain can see roughly how much is stored, when files were added, and when wrong attempts were made. Not how many vaults there are, or what is in them.
- Screenshot blanking relies on how iOS treats password fields and could stop working in a future iOS. Lock on screenshot happens after the screenshot. Nothing stops another camera photographing the screen.
- A disguise makes the app less obvious at a glance. It doesn't hide that Nightjar is installed: the name still appears in iOS Settings and the App Store.
- A locked folder is a speed bump for a phone handed over unlocked, not a second key: its files use the vault's own key.
- Overwriting deleted files is best effort on flash storage. What protects deleted items is that they are encrypted and their key is gone.
- Clearing keys from memory is best effort: the app wipes what it controls, but can't prove no copy exists elsewhere in memory.
Independent audit: planned, not done
The design is documented and tested, including a test that scans every stored byte for anything readable. It has not yet had an independent security audit. One is planned, and the results will be published on this page.
Report a security issue
If you believe you have found a security problem, write to the address on the support page with "Security" in the subject, the app version, your iPhone or iPad model and iOS version, and the steps to reproduce it. Please don't include any vault content, code or recovery phrase, and give us a reasonable time to fix it before you publish.
Support and contact